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Abstract 
Denial-of-Service attacks continue to be a serious 
problem for the Internet community despite the fact that a 
large number of defense approaches has been proposed by 
the research community. In this paper we introduce IP Fast 
Hopping, easily deployable and effective network-layer 
architecture against DDoS attacks. Our approach also 
provides an easy way for clients to hide content and 
destination server of theirs communication sessions. We 
describe a method of dynamic server IP address change 
and all modules necessary to implement the approach.  
1 Introduction 
A Denial-of-Service attack is characterizes by an explicit 
attempt to prevent the legitimate use of a service. A 
Distributed Denial-of-Service attack deploys multiple 
attacking entities to attain this goal [10]. In such attacks, a 
single bot or a group of bots are sending a large number of 
packets that lead to exhausting of victim’s bandwidth 
capacity or software processing capabilities. 
According to [10], methods of DDoS attacks can be 
divided by the two groups: semantic attacks and brute-
force (flood) attacks. A semantic attack exploits a specific 
feature or implementation bug of some protocol or 
application installed at the victim in order to consume 
excess amounts of its resources. For example, an attacker 
can send a specific consequence of packets initiating CPU 
time consuming procedures on the server. In case of a large 
number of such requests, the victim is unable to handle 
requests from legitimate clients. Undesirable impact from 
such attack can be minimized by protocol or software 
modifying and by applying of special filter mechanisms. In 
our paper, we introduce a DDoS defense mechanism that 
aims to filter all TCP traffic issued by unauthorized clients 
on network level. Therefore unauthorized malefactor is 
unable to perform semantic attacks based on TCP protocol 
on the victim server. 
A brute-force attack is an attack aimed to prevent 
legitimate service using by exhausting of bandwidth. E.g. it 
is a large number of short requests to the victim which 
initiates heavy responses sent by the victim. Together these 
streams overfills bandwidth of the victim server or it’s ISP. 
In contrast to semantic attacks, brute-force attacks abuses 
legal services so installing of filtering mechanisms for such 
requests will impact traffic from legitimate client too. 
During brute-force DDoS attacks a number of malefactor 
terminals (botnet) and legitimate users are connected to the 
victim at the same time (see Figure 1). Each bot sends a 
big number of requests to the victim which creates heavy 
malicious traffic targeted at the server. Since the increase 
in the flow of requests is created here increase the number 
of terminals, then whichever level of server performance 
has not been achieved starting from a certain number of 
bots, they create the flow of requests exceeds the 
permissible level for any server. 
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Figure 1: Schema of brute-force DDoS attack 
 
Size and frequency of DDoS attack is continue to grow 
despite on the fact that a large number of defense 
mechanisms have been proposed. According to [14] 
application layer attacks rose approximately 42% in 2013 
from 2012, infrastructure layer attacks increased 
approximately 30% at the same period. The infrastructure 
layer DDoS attacks are still most popular: around 77% of 
DDoS attacks in Q4 2013 were infrastructure layer attacks. 
The average size of attacks increased by 19.5% from Q1 
2012 to Q1 2013 (up to 1.77 GB/s) [7]. So, developing 
new DDoS prevention mechanisms is still a topical issue. 
Each new DDoS defense method should satisfy the 
following main principles: 
 Real world applicability. Now a number of different 
approaches have been suggested in literature which 
require a significant changes of existing network 
architecture of ISPs or entire Internet architecture. But 
the main problem here that mostly DDoS attacks 
threaten organizations which provide services to end 
 
 
users [13], and so this problem is not very vital for 
transit ISPs because they actually suffer very little 
from such attacks. Thus, priority will be given to such 
systems, which filters malicious traffic without 
changing of global network architecture, into server’s 
or edge ISP’s networks.  
 The solution must be designed to prevent misuse. So, 
it must be not possible to exploit the method to 
increase impact issues by an attack or to filter 
legitimate traffic. 
2 Related work 
The rise of DDoS attack frequency in recent years has 
resulted in many proposed defense approaches from the 
community. For example, patent [3] suggests solution on 
application level. According to the article, the server sends 
a special response on first connection attempt from a client. 
The client uses this response to identify new URL address, 
after that the client creates new requests and sends this new 
requests to this new URL. After receiving this second 
request, the server validates the new URL based on sent 
response. If the value does not exceed preset load 
threshold, the packet will be prioritized and processed by 
the server. Thus the solution is based on applying of 
special filter on server side; this filter controls prioritizing 
of client’s requests depending on load on the server at the 
moment of receiving of the first request from the client. 
Other high level approach was suggested under [1]. This 
method introduced special server responsible for creating 
and updating of cryptographically secured keys. Each 
client can access to the service only after successful 
legitimacy verification on this special server. Thus, client 
should be successfully authorized on the special server to 
get a secure key which should be used for processing of a 
special scenario. The aim of this scenario is identifying 
client’s legitimacy. These approaches purpose defense 
methods on application layer and does not impact IP 
packets exchange. So, a malefactor can perform brute force 
attack on the server. 
Also, the research community suggested a wide scope of 
different more low level approaches. For example, [9] 
purposes dividing of data stream transmitted between 
server and client into two consecutive segments on TCP 
level. This work suggested comparing of keys of two 
consecutive segments to detect possible segments from not 
legitimate source. In case of detection of such segments, 
data receiving will be blocked to prevent possible impact 
from attack. 
Paper [11] introduces DDoS defense mechanism based 
on dynamic change of server’s IP address. Server’s IP 
address is changing according to pseudo-random law 
which is known only for authorized clients. At the first 
sight the work [11] purposes a similar DDoS prevention 
mechanism (dynamic changing of IP address), but this 
contains some significant differences. Among others, are: 
 IP address of the victim is changing only during active 
DDoS attack on the server 
 The new IP address is assigned for all client sessions 
simultaneously on a relatively long time (suggested 
period is around 5 minutes) 
 Accurate time synchronization is required for 
calculation of each next IP address since external 
timestamp is using. 
3 IP Fast Hopping method 
In our paper, we introduce a DDoS prevention 
mechanism based on protocol level defense methods which 
was suggested under patent [8]. The main goal of this 
technique is counteraction to exhausting of server’s 
resources initiated by attackers and prevention of 
legitimate traffic filtering. To archive these aims, the 
method is using real-time changing of server’s IP address 
according to a schedule which is available only for 
authorized clients. Attackers can’t get access to this 
schedule, so they cannot send requests to the correct IP 
address. Due to this effect, bots are unable to create enough 
high load on the server to prevent normal system behavior. 
In our work, we suggest to call this method as IP Fast 
Hopping. 
The method suggested in this paper is similar to radio 
systems with frequency hopping. In such systems, receiver 
and transmitter are switching from one frequency to other 
frequency synchronously during an ongoing data 
transmission session. A malefactor’s transmitter, which is 
going to introduce a noise into such session, has not an 
actual schedule of frequency hopping; therefore such 
attacker cannot create a noticeable harm for the legitimate 
transmitter defended by frequency hopping mechanism.  
In our case, frequency can be treated like IP address. So, 
the legitimate client must know schedule of server’s IP 
address changing. At the same time, the schedule should be 
not available for non-legitimate clients. 
The method of IP masquerading for received packets is 
utilized in Network Address Translation technology. In 
contrast to the technique suggested in this paper, such IP 
masquerading is permanent during the entire session, i.e. 
mapping of the internal constant address to a temporary 
external address is not changing during a session [5]. This 
approach provides a way to share limited external network 
resources between a large number of devices. In our paper, 
we propose to make such mapping dynamic. 
According to DDoS prevention mechanism based on IP 
hopping approach, DNS entries are equal to IP address of 
the authorization server instead of IP address of the 
protected server. To access the protected server, each client 
must be tested on legitimacy on this authorization server. 
Authorization process can cover validation of user’s 
login/password, user’s subscription on a service and so on. 
In case of successful client’s authorization, the client is 
redirecting to special server, IP Hopper Manager, instead 
 
 
of to the protected server. This server is controller of 
enhanced secured sessions. In this paper, enhanced secured 
session is a communication session between client and 
server which is protected by IP Fast Hopping method. The 
legitimate client must establish secured connection to this 
controller. The IP Hopper Manager will use this 
connection to transmit a pool of IP addresses and unique 
identifier of the session to the client’s terminal. The IP 
Hopper Manager sends the same information to a set of 
edge switchers randomly located in the Internet. These 
switchers must support IP Fast Hopping method and the 
server must be signed on this service. In this paper, the 
edge switcher is high performance switcher which is edge 
relatively to the suggested protection mechanism, because 
in the network sector between this switcher and the 
protected server the data stream is not have any difference 
in comparison with the case when IP Fast Hopping was not 
deployed. The IP pool is not ordered and each IP address 
must be related to this switchers set. Also, this pool should 
not contain the real server’s IP and the “initial” IP. The 
initial IP is public virtual address of the protected server. 
All client’s applications use the initial IP address instead of 
real IP address of the server. 
After such handshake the client starts communication 
session with the server. During communication session 
between the client and the protected server, IP address of 
the server is hopping between addresses from this pool in 
real-time. The client’s terminal is changing initial IP 
address in the destination address field of each outgoing 
packet on an address from the pool of IP addresses 
according to a special hash function. This hash function is 
mapping timestamps field of TCP header [6] and unique 
identifier of the session to an entry of the IP pool. This 
UID can be obtained for the private key of a certificate 
installed on the client’s equipment or can be received from 
IP Hopper Manager as was mentioned above. After such 
replacement of the initial address to a virtual address from 
the IP pool, the packet is transmitted over the Internet to 
one of edge switchers according to common switching 
protocols. 
When the edge switcher received the packet from the 
client, the switcher calculates the same pseudo-random 
function with the same arguments as was done on the client 
side. If the result of this calculation is the same to the 
destination address field of IP header, the packet is 
forwarded to the real IP address of the server as legitimate 
packet. Otherwise, this packet will be dropped as malicious 
packet. 
The same procedures (but in reverse mode) will be 
applied for each server’s responses to the client. After 
receiving of such packets, client’s terminal changes 
server’s virtual IP into source field on initial IP address, 
after that the packet can be processed by client’s 
application by a common way. 
As the result, from the point of view of an external 
observer of the client-server communication session, the IP 
address of the server is changing regularly to a random 
address with each increment of timestamps field into TCP 
header of the packet (usually every millisecond). 
Prediction of destination IP of the next packet is very 
difficult for an external observer due to the fact that 
destination IP is changing according to pseudo-random 
function and this observer has not information about 
parameters of this function (UID or real server’s IP 
address). 
If the IP pool is not large enough, a botnet can start an 
attack on each IP address using masquerading of malicious 
traffic as legitimate data stream by IP spoofing technique 
[2]. In this case, edge routers redirects part of hateful 
traffic together with legal traffic to the protected server. In 
this paper, we suggest the following options to mitigate 
such risks: 
1. The IP pool which is used for IP Fast Hopping should 
be large enough to make such excessive attack very 
resource consuming and non-efficient for possible 
attackers. Obviously, the method will be more 
efficient in IPv6 systems. In this case, IP pool can 
contain a thousands of addresses related to a number 
of different routers in the Internet. 
2. IP providers should apply IP spoofing filtering 
mechanisms, e.g. [4] 
The described particular qualities of introduced DDoS 
protection mechanism allow to use this method not only 
for DDoS prevention but also for defense of 
communication session between server and client. In this 
paper, all TCP packets in each client-server 
communication session transmitted via network according 
to IP Fast Hopping rules without depending on existing of 
active attack on the server. This fact causes the following 
effect: for an external observer close to the client, the 
communication session between the client and the Internet 
service does not look like packet stream between terminal 
of the client and a server on which this Internet server is 
hosted. This session is visible for an external observer as 
different communication sessions between the client and a 
large scope of different servers in the Internet and data 
stream is randomly mixed between these streams. From an 
external observer point of view, interpretation of these data 
stream into one logical data stream are difficult process. 
Also, due to the fact that one pool of virtual IP addresses is 
shared between different Internet services at the same time, 
such external observer close to the client is unable to 
identify server which established communication session. 
So, IP Fast Hopping could be used in cases when clients 
want to hide content of data stream and destination of this 
stream.  
4 System architecture 
Our paper introduces DDoS protection mechanism aims 
to prevent access to the server from a botnet by dynamic 
changing of IP address of the server. Such system can have 
 
 
a scope of different implementations, but our work takes 
into account the following requirement: the suggested 
approach should be easy deployable in real world 
conditions and should not require a significant changes of 
existing network architecture or network equipment. Easy 
deployability means that switching to the suggested 
defense method does not require a considerable preparation 
or workflow changes for an Internet server or its clients. 
To archive these goals, our work uses only existing 
commonly used technologies and protocols and also the 
logical core of the system is deployable into external (for 
the server and its clients) networks (e.g. into ISP 
networks). 
We can say that our work is a new point of view on 
using of existing abilities of TCP/IP protocols. Our paper 
introduced re-use of already used technologies for DDoS 
attacks prevention. An example of such alternative 
utilization, the timestamps field of TCP packet header, are 
suggested to be used not only to identify the correct 
packets order [6], but at the same time this field can be 
used to identify the correct destination address of the 
packet as was described above. 
Also, our work introduced distributed DDoS defense 
mechanism: an Internet server is being hidden behind a 
large pool of virtual IP addresses which belong to a big 
number of routers in different sectors of the Internet. Since 
this IP address pool is public, botnets can initiate DDoS 
attacks on one or several of these IP addresses. But the 
pool is divided into groups of addresses which belong to 
various routers in various Internet sectors. So the stream of 
malicious packets initiated by a botnet is divided into 
several sub-streams directed to several Internet sectors by 
commonly used switching protocols. And, according to our 
work, this stream will be filtered into this different 
networks. This approach defends the victim server and also 
our method decreases load on network infrastructure of 
victim and it’s ISP during active DDoS attack. 
In case of deploying of the introduced defense 
mechanism, the original client-server architecture (see 
Figure 1) contains some new blocks (see updated schema 
on Figure 2). The suggested architecture has the following 
difference: 
1. As was mentioned above, the DNS server contains 
link to IP address of Authorization server instead of IP 
address of Internet-service 
Legitimate client
The Internet
Authorization serverDNS server
ISP router #1
ISP router #N
ISP
or several separate ISPs
...
IP Hopper Manager
...
Botnet
Internet-service
(victim)
Bot #1 Bot #2 Bot #M
 
Figure 2: IP Fast Hopping architecture 
2. Introduced Authorization server which validates 
legitimation of the client. If client successfully 
authorized and the client’s terminal has a special SSL 
certificate and supports IP Fast Hopping algorithm 
(i.e. installed special software – IP Hopper Core), 
Authorization server initiates handshake between the 
client’s IP Hopper Core and IP Hopper Manager 
3. IP Hopper Core is special system utility installed on 
client’s terminal and ISP routers #1 - #N (entire IP 
pool belongs to these routers). This utility is 
performing establishing of enhanced secured 
connection and real-time changing of initial IP address 
of the Internet-service on one address from IP pool 
according to rules of IP Fast Hopping. 
4. IP Hopper Manager is a server which is responsible 
for controlling the enhanced secure connections 
between Internet-services and clients. 
Time chart of introduced defense mechanism can be 
found on Figure 3. 
5 Implementation 
As was noted above, one of requirements for our work is 
real world deployability. Therefore, we implement IP Fast 
Hopping mechanism as kernel module of OS GNU/Linux. 
In this case, installing this module on routers based on 
GNU/Linux is enough to deploy the suggested system. In 
our work we build such routers based on Debian OS. 
Linux kernel contains built-in firewall Netfilter [12], 
which is responsible on packet filtering and forwarding 
according to predefined rules by iptables utility. Netfilter 
architecture is scope of hooks of ordered rules. Netfilter 
performs a predefined action with a packet, which is 
passed to a hook, according to the corresponding rule. 
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Figure 3: Time Chart of IP Fast Hopping
Netfilter supports 5 hooks: PREROUTING, INPUT, 
FORWARD, OUTPUT, POSTROUTING. When the 
packet comes to the system, the packet is processed by 
PREROUTING hook. If this packet is addressed to a local 
process, it is passed to INPUT hook, otherwise it is passed 
to FORWARD. All packets sent by local processes are 
processed by OUTPUT hook. The final processing of the 
packet outgoing from the system (forwarded under 
FORWARD hook or issued by a local process) is 
performing by POSTROUTING hook. 
In our work, Netfilter contains new module which is 
responsible for changing of IP address into destination 
field of outgoing packets and into source field of ingoing 
packets. This module is calculating the new IP address 
according to IP Fast Hopping rules (by timestamp field and 
session UID). During handshake, IP Hopper Manager adds 
new set of rules into POSTROUTING hook on client’s 
terminal and into PREROUTING each edge switcher. This 
rule activates the kernel module which implements the 
following algorithm: 
 On the client side this module calculates hash-function 
using timestamps field and session UID for each 
outgoing packet addressed to the initial IP address. 
After that the module uses this result as index of 
correct address into IP pool which should be put into 
destination field of the packet. For each ingoing packet 
from the same communication session, the module 
performs the same actions for source field: checks the 
current value of the field (by calculation of the same 
hash-function) and changes it on the initial address. 
 
 On switchers side this module calculates hash-function 
using timestamps field and session UID for each 
ingoing packet addressed to IP addresses from IP pool. 
If the current destination address corresponds to the 
timestamps field and session UID, the real IP address 
of the server will be placed into the destination field. 
Otherwise, the packet will be dropped. For all ingoing 
packets issued by the server, the module will replace 
source field by one of virtual addresses according to 
current value of hash-function. 
6 Conclusions 
We presented IP Fast Hopping, a new approach that can 
prevent exhausting of server’s resources during brute-force 
DDoS attacks and can be used to hide content and 
destination of client’s communication session. This method 
hides the real IP address of the server behind a big number 
of “virtual” IP addresses. The mapping of the real IP 
address on one of “virtual” is unique for each 
communication session and changes dynamically every 
millisecond. The introduced approach is distributed: it 
divides the traffic from legitimate users and botnets into a 
number of sub-streams. This leads to a decrease of load on 
network infrastructure during active DDoS attack. The 
method is easily deployable and can filter even the biggest 
malicious streams.  
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